Africa

The Algerian presidential elections have been in a state of flux since the beginning of 2019. Initially former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika intended to run for reelection to a fifth term in office, but amid an outpouring of protests at this prospect due to allegations of corruption he withdrew his reelection bid and postponed the election as a result. The election was originally scheduled for April 18, 2019 has been rescheduled for July 4th (“Alegeria sets presidential…”). Shortly after announcing he would not seek a fifth term Bouteflika resigned as president leaving the head of the Council of the Nation (Algeria’s upper house of parliament), Abdelkader Bensalah, to be acting head of state. Bensalah is not able to participate as a candidate in the election under Algerian law (“Algerian Constitutional Council…”).

Beginning in February 2019, Algeria played host to months of fierce protesting over wheelchair-bound President Bouteflika’s bid for re-election that was scheduled to take place in April. The election was subsequently postponed by interim President Bensalah to July 4th. Speculation has been rife in Algeria as well as the foreign media as to whether the election will indicate a maintaining of the status quo or an overhaul of the entire Algerian political system.

After the death of Muhammar Ghaddafi and the subsequent end of the Libyan Jamahiriya, Libya’s transitional government has since crumbled into a multifaceted conflict with different political groups vying for power and influence over potent oil fields. The General National Congress (GNC) took control over Libya after the death of Ghaddafi as a representative assembly. Internal fragmentation in the GNC precluded agreements on political issues and was unable to withstand several other warring factions. Several former political officials fled Tripoli (and the GNC) to Tobruk, a city on the eastern border of Libya, and established a second parliament known as the House of Representatives. The Libyan National Army (LNA), headed by Khalifa Haftar, is recognized as a quasi-military unit, comprised of trained military officials alongside tribal and regional groups of soldiers. The LNA is not recognized by the GNC as a military force; instead, the GNC recognizes Haftar as an agitator and a “warlord”. In addition to the two existing governments and the LNA, Islamic fundamentalist groups loyal to ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood exist throughout the state and commit various terrorist acts and beheadings.

Over the course of the last decade, China has taken an aggressive approach towards constructing an economic relationship with Africa. A major aspect of this relationship has been Chinese infrastructure investments in the continent, which provides African nations with low-conditionality access to capital. Although China’s economic activity has led to some economic growth in the region, it nonetheless represents a strategic challenge to the United States’ influence in Africa (Harris 2018). As such, the strategic efforts of the United States vis a vis Chinese investment in Africa should center on two objectives: increasing diplomatic ties with African nations and promoting American investment and trade in the region.

Over the last half decade, there have been several incidents of violence between Nigerian security forces and the Shia group known as the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN). The IMN, are led by the cleric Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. Originally from the northern city of Zaria, El-Zakzaky is a self-professed admirer of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and critic of the Nigerian government. He travelled to Iran in 1980 in order to become a cleric and be able to bring Shi’ism to Nigeria (Campbell 2018). From the 1990s onward, El-Zakzaky has attracted thousands of followers as he promotes the widespread adoption of Islamic law by the Nigerian government, with the ultimate goal of turning it into an Islamic Republic.

Chinese low conditionality approach to infrastructure loans in Africa has been billed as a great opportunity for developing nations in the region to achieve economic development and growth that would otherwise not be possible. However, despite representing what one Ugandan economist described as an “unrivalled willingness to avail unconditional capital to Africa”, China’s extensive penetration in Africa by way of development-oriented loans comes with a significant amount of risk, both for the host nations as well as the United States and the West (Madowo, 2018).

Background

Ethnic Violence, Insurgency, and Conflict