Sam Jacobson

“Aside from a small number of low-level plots either thwarted or failed, there have not been any successful terrorist attacks on Italian soil since 9/11, a trend that has remained true since the rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in 2014” (Vidino 2017). Why is this the case? Why has Italy not been on the receiving end of recent brutal terror attacks in the same way that many other European nations have? By this research, I attempt to understand what Italy has done to mitigate terror threats better than other European nations. To do this, it is important to distinguish luck from planning, as one theory purports that there is no inherent piece of the Italian system that has reduced the threat of terrorism. My research indicates that a series of factors are important, including policing, border policies, historical context, radicalization issues, and governmental practices and policies. Italy excels in many areas where other nations do not, occasionally at the expense of due process and human rights. In this research design, Italy will be compared across Europe as a whole, the EU, and Western Europe in different situations. However, these strengths in comprehensive Italian counterterrorism are still fallible; it would be unwise to predict that these trends are foolproof as the potential for terror always exists, especially as growing numbers of second-generation immigrants experience the potential for radicalization.

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) is a Basque separatist group that formed in 1959. For a half-century, ETA actively perpetrated over a hundred terror attacks across Spain and France. The ultimate political goal was that of a unified and independent Basque land that comprises the Basque region in northern Spain and southwestern France. There is very little debate over ETA’s actions throughout the second half of the 20th century. However, recent events have called the US foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designation into question. The proclaimed cessation of all paramilitary operations and ultimate disbanding of any political aims and structure in 2018 would make the FTO designation pointless (Jones 2018). Because of the stated disbanding of the group, it would be a mere technicality to remove ETA from the list of FTOs – nothing gained, nothing lost. However, ETA as an idea rather than populated organization still creates cause for concern. That in mind, it would be useful to compare the current activities and influences of ETA with similar groups that are not listed as FTOs to make the case that ETA should no longer be listed. Other similar groups exist with even a stated modus operandi that are not listed. A designation as FTO also further complicates genuine political activities surrounding Basque separatism that are legitimate and unaffiliated with ETA.

A United Nations Security Council communication released in July warned that although the incidence rate of Islamic-motivated terrorism has declined in the last months, the terror threat is still high. The Security Council noted that while ISIL no longer has any geographic holdings, its presence in Iraq and surrounding states combined with its ideology and ability to undermine fragile West African political structures still pose threats. Furthermore, the progress made by Al-Qaida and its allies, although financially less formidable than ISIL, creates similar cause for concern.

Recent developments in diplomatic relations between the United States and Russia have greatly impacted the nature of arms control in the two nuclear giants. Historically guided by various treaties, including the START, SALT, and INF agreements, nuclear tension has increased as the 2019 withdrawal from the INF Treaty by both Russia and the US has opened the door to expanded proliferation.

The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (Mojahedin-e Khalq), otherwise referred to as MEK, is a left-wing resistance party that aims to overthrow the current Iranian ruling regime. Born from various factions of dissident Iranian students in Tehran, the MEK has operated since the 1960s in various locations throughout Southwest Asia and, most recently, Europe. The group’s name, Mujahedin-e Khalq, roughly translates from Persian (Farsi) into “the People’s Holy Warriors.” With this notion, the MEK has consistently operated against the Iranian government to promote its often liberal-democratic agenda (Goulka 2).