The Thawing Battlefield: Why the Arctic Matters for U.S. Security

A growing arena of great-power rivalry lies hidden beneath the world’s attention: the Arctic. Uninhabited, isolated, and cold, it is also warming faster than any other region on Earth, transforming from a frozen frontier into a contested geopolitical stage. As the ice melts, two of America’s greatest competitors, Russia and China, are carving footholds in this new domain, while the U.S. struggles to define its role.

Introduction

The Arctic is governed by both bordering countries and international agreements: Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S. are known as the Arctic States [1]. Notably absent from that list is China, which joined the International Arctic Science Committee in 1996, secured permanent observer status on the Arctic Council, and has since expanded their presence through science, shipping, and investment [2].

Two major international agreements regulate Arctic governance: the Polar Code, which sets environmental and safety standards; and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which defines states’ rights in Arctic waters [1].

Melting ice has already increased navigability. Scientists project that by 2035, large portions of the Arctic Ocean could be ice-free during summer months, unlocking faster shipping routes between the U.S., Europe, and Asia [3, 4]. The change is well underway: by 2024, the Arctic Council reported a 37% increase in vessel traffic over a decade, 41% of which were fishing ships and 10% cargo vessels [5].

Yet, the U.S. response to this transformation has been hesitant and fragmented. Washington’s Arctic strategy tries to balance three conflicting goals—great-power competition, environmental protection, and Indigenous development—without a clear hierarchy. The result is a patchwork of aspirations without implementation power.

China and Russia in the Arctic

China’s rise as a polar actor is no longer subtle. In 2018, Beijing’s white paper on the Arctic declared it a “near-Arctic state”, despite being nearly 1,000 NAU from the region [6, 7]. It outlined plans for a “Polar Silk Road” to complement its Belt and Road Initiative, linking Asian and European markets through northern trade routes [6].

In partnership with Russia, China’s Arctic ambitions have deepened. Chinese companies are now among the most frequent users of Russia’s Northern Sea Route, gaining access to vast resource projects. The Arctic currently accounts for 80% of Russia’s natural gas and 20% of its petroleum production [8, 9]. Meanwhile, China’s interest in Arctic fishing reflects its growing demand for seafood amid domestic overfishing [10].

While President Trump’s 2019 remarks about “buying Greenland” were dismissed as bluster, they reflected genuine security anxieties. Researchers at the Arctic Institute have since argued that U.S. attention should focus not on Greenland, but on Alaska, positioned along the increasingly active Bering Strait [11]. There, China-Russia joint military operations—from naval patrols to bomber flights within the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone—have surged [4].

The Greenland issue can be managed with NATO partners like Denmark and Canada, but the North Pacific Arctic near Alaska is becoming the true pressure point of great-power competition [4, 10]. The “swarm of Russian and Chinese ships” once feared off Greenland is instead taking shape in waters much closer to home [10].

Some researchers argue that the Arctic remains peripheral to U.S.-China competition and should not be overemphasized [12]. However, as the polar caps thaw, inaction will only magnify the challenges the U.S. faces in asserting presence and protecting its northern interests.

Aging Infrastructure

The U.S. lacks the tools to sustain a long-term presence in the Arctic. As of 2025, it operates only two heavy icebreakers, compared to Russia’s forty [13, 14]. The U.S. has not built a new heavy icebreaker since the 1970s [13]. These vessels are vital for search and rescue, scientific missions, and power projection.

Defending the Arctic will also require more deep-water ports for Navy and Coast Guard use, such as Project Nome, whose funding was cut in 2024 [15]. Recent progress has been made in Arctic communications with the Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission launched in 2024, improving regional connectivity across shipping, aviation, and defense [16]. However, much more is needed to modernize radar, infrastructure, and logistics capabilities.

Many of the regions that still lack reliable communication are inhabited by Indigenous peoples, yet their expertise and potential contributions remain underutilized. As the polar caps melt, these communities face mounting threats from coastal erosion and forced relocation. However, they are also equipped with generations of knowledge about Arctic terrain, weather, and wildlife patterns—insight that could be invaluable to U.S. operations [17]. Integrating Indigenous expertise would not only improve policy legitimacy but also strengthen early warning systems and expand local presence in regions where the U.S. military lacks infrastructure.

Policy Recommendations

U.S. strategy in the Arctic remains reactionary rather than proactive. Instead of merely countering Russia and China, Washington should define its own vision for Arctic governance and infrastructure development. The 2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy emphasizes military readiness and cooperation with Alaska and allies [9], but lacks coordination with the State Department, Coast Guard, and NOAA. A unified interagency framework is essential for coherent policy implementation.

Washington should also shift its primary focus from Greenland to Alaska, where U.S. presence and readiness are most strategically valuable. Strengthening Alaskan defenses and domain awareness will yield higher returns than symbolic debates over Greenland. At the same time, the U.S. should press Denmark and NATO allies to expand Arctic readiness. Many allied militaries possess superior Arctic training and can provide invaluable expertise through joint operations [13].

These efforts should be paired with meaningful Indigenous inclusion. Incorporating Indigenous leaders, corporations, and councils into Arctic planning is not merely ethical—it is strategic. Indigenous communities provide local expertise, situational awareness, and consistent presence where U.S. military infrastructure is thin.

Finally, the U.S. must rebalance its defense spending. The Department of Defense does not need a larger budget, just a smarter one. Redirecting funds from legacy weapons systems toward icebreakers, deep-sea ports, and Arctic communication networks would establish genuine presence and deterrence.

Conclusion

The Arctic is no longer a frozen frontier; it is the new frontier of great-power competition. As Russia entrenches its dominance and China positions itself as a “near-Arctic state,” America risks strategic irrelevance in a region tied to global trade, climate, and security.

U.S. policymakers must act before the thaw outpaces strategy. By integrating Arctic governance, modernizing infrastructure, and reallocating defense spending toward genuine northern capability, the United States can turn a zone of vulnerability into one of resilience and leadership. The ice is melting, but U.S. attention doesn’t have to.