Saudi Arabia

U.S. gas prices soared in June of this year to an all-time high of $4.99 per gallon –– a 47% increase from prices at the start of 2022. In response to this raging inflation, President Biden traveled to Saudi Arabia in July, with part of the agenda set to discuss boosting oil production with Saudi OPEC leaders. His proposal was rejected and OPEC retained plans to cut oil production, which will drive up global energy prices further. These cuts have yet to be implemented. At the G20 summit in Egypt this November, world leaders acknowledged Western sanctions against Russia and resultantly high inflation rates that have driven up energy prices worldwide. Despite the energy crisis, G20 leaders reaffirmed their commitments to the Paris Agreement and worldwide efforts toward a clean energy transition.

In late October, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Saudi Arabia to meet with King Salman to discuss oil investment between the two countries. Two important pacts were signed during this visit to encourage partnership and cooperation in setting up fuel reserves. The India-Saudi Strategic Partnership Council was formed to allow for India to “address its expectations and aspirations” (Pant). According to the Economic Times, “Saudi Arabia is India’s second biggest supplier of oil after Iraq. It is also now India’s fourth largest trading partner with bilateral trade at $27.48 billion in 2017-18 and Saudi investment of around $100 billion is in the pipeline in areas ranging from energy, refining, petrochemicals and infrastructure to agriculture, minerals and mining” (Contributors, 2019). These meetings between India and Saudi Arabia are setting the stage for the economy to grow and for closer ties between these two countries.

Last month, cruise missiles targeted and damaged oil facilities in Saudi Arabia owned by Saudi Aramco. The Houthis in Yemen immediately claimed responsibility for the attack and the United States and Saudi Arabia blamed Iran soon afterwards, insisting the missiles were launched from southern Iran.[1] The reactions of other countries, particularly those remaining in the JCPOA, have proven to be just as important.

Over the past two and a half years of the Trump administration, American energy companies have quietly made deals with Saudi Arabian energy officials to begin trading information on nuclear energy.[1] The United States and Saudi Arabia see nuclear development as a very symbiotic and lucrative deal, which could bring the US several billions of dollars in trade revenue every year. However, several politicians and energy officials fear that a nuclear arms race will develop between Iran and SA.[2] SA hopes to both satisfy its increasing power needs and protect itself.[3] Despite some hesitations, the US has moved forward with authorizations as the Kingdom hopes to build two new plants in the coming years.

On October 25, 2012, The New York Times published an eye-opening report on an extensive, billion-dollar business empire constructed by relatives of China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao. Three months later, the Times revealed it had been undergoing intense cyber attacks even before the report was publicly released. Cooperating with AT&T, the FBI, and a leading cybersecurity firm, the Times pinned the digital break-ins on Chinese hackers, adding that the Chinese military was likely involved.

The constant tumult in Sudan is keeping the international community on its toes. After months of protesting and violence, the military overthrew President Omar al-Bashir in April of this year and established a transitional military council. The TMC declared there would be a two-year transitional period after which the state would hold elections. Pro-democracy protests continued as demonstrators called for a civilian-led transitional body, citing that the TMC was no better than the previous regime they had fought to remove. On June 3, the TMC massacred hundreds of protestors and instituted an internet black out worse than any during al-Bashir’s rule. After another mass protest on June 30, the TMC and the civilian opposition began negotiating with the help of envoys from Ethiopia and the African Union. These negotiations led to an agreement on a joint sovereign council comprised of eleven members: five military, five civilian, and an unknown eleventh member. This council would govern for three years while organizing elections. The military will rule for the first 21 months, and the civilian government will assume control for the next 18 months. On Thursday, Sudan was rocked by another military coup, an attempt that was shortly foiled by security forces. Skeptics say the coup was fabricated by the military in order to pressure the civilian opposition group into signing the deal. This constant political flux works in the military’s favor, leaving civilians at a disadvantage at the negotiating table.

Now that the possibility of a US missile strike in Syria has faded, US attention has been diverted to other matters in the Middle East, namely, negotiations with Iran. However, the diminished threat of intervention combined with a weak UN Security Council Resolution has led to a significant loss of US influence among the Syrian opposition. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), one of two al-Qaeda branches operating in Syria, has capitalized on this influence vacuum by attempting to establish its dominance within rebel-held territory. In response to an ascendant ISIS and general frustration with US foreign policy, opposition fighting groups are beginning to form Islamic coalitions independent of the US-backed Syrian National Council. US policymakers will now have to deal with a stronger al-Qaeda presence and less capacity to bolster anti-regime forces.

The events in Syria in past weeks show that the civil war has transformed into a greater regional sectarian conflict. Because of the nuanced and complex nature of this conflict, a deeper look at many aspects is required for an adequate analysis. This analysis is the second of two parts. The first focused on al-Qaeda operations and Iranian influence in Syria; this second part focuses on the Balkanizing of the Syrian state, Kurdish autonomy, and the implications of potential US intervention in Syria after the large-scale use of chemical weapons.