Putin

Recently, Xi Jinping, the leader of China, and Vladimir Putin, leader of Russia, met at the Kremlin in Russia to participate in talks of their strategic vision for the future. This visit comes amid the still ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine and raises eyebrows for state leaders around the world watching closely as relationships between China and Russia grow tighter. The meeting was advertised as a way for the “self-described friends” to show their personal support for each other.

Although first becoming active years before Russia’s “special military operation”, Wagner Group, the private military contractor and parastatal arm of the Russian military has become increasingly visible since the invasion of Ukraine. The PMC is a convenient asset for the Kremlin, however recent critical comments made by Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin about top Russian military leadership indicate developing growing pains in the relationship between the Russian government and Wagner Group.

With talks currently in place between the two countries in preparation for further integration, it is important to understand how both Russia and Belarus got to this point in their somewhat strained relationship. Looking at the two countries from a westerner’s perspective, one might think that the two countries have always been allied forces with a one-track mind, but when you dig a little deeper you may find that appearances aren’t always true to what is really going on underneath.

Thousands of protesters took to the streets after Russian lawmaker Sergei Gavrilov, deputy of the Russian State Duma, sat in the Georgian parliamentary speaker’s seat and addressed the audience in Russian. Gavrilov was there as president of the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy (IAO), “a body set up by the Greek parliament in 1993 to foster relationships between Christian Orthodox lawmakers” (Antidze). Protests cut IAO meetings short.

Putin proved a major influencer in the US presidential election in 2016. Russian influence on the election first appeared four years before the actual election, when two Russians, working for the Internet Research Agency, acquired knowledge about US social media to help provide information to the Russian propaganda machine (Shane, Scott; Mazzetti, Mark. 2018). Additionally, his Russian spy agency, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) hacked the Democratic National Committee’s network to further reach his goal of getting Americans to vote for the candidate he wanted to see win.

Mr. Putin would casually deny it, but Russia has fashioned the ongoing civil conflict in Eastern Ukraine in a manner that suits the Kremlin’s goals. The opening actions of the rebellion were pulled off without too many snags and managed to seize significant political and economic sites throughout the region, ranging from police stations to major railroad junctions. A growing amount of evidence suggests that these seemingly homegrown insurrections were originally led and coordinated by Russian operatives disguised as locals. Videos and eyewitness accounts show large convoys of vehicles packed with armed, uniformed men (many belonging to the Vostok Battalion, of Chechen War notoriety) streaming into Ukraine from over the Russian border. While this isn’t exactly hard evidence of the Kremlin’s direct involvement, it does speak volumes about what entities are fueling the current strife. Despite these occurrences, Putin does not seem interested in invading and annexing the eastern provinces of Ukraine in the same way that he did Crimea. This article discusses why Moscow does not want to absorb Eastern Ukraine, as well as what Russia’s true intensions are.