On September 26, 2025, Moldova held parliamentary elections that were widely framed as a defining moment for the country. Would Moldova be pulled back into the Russian sphere of influence, or would it solidify its path towards European Union membership and affirm its independence from Moscow? Many feared Russian interference would lead to a skewed election and cause Moldova to follow Georgia’s current path of democratic recession. The election resulted in the pro-EU. The Party of Action and Solidarity (P.A.S.) won just over 50% of the vote, giving them an outright majority in parliament.
Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Moldovan government has swung between pro-Russian and pro-Western leadership. Pro-Russian leaders have strengthened Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas and industry for economic gain and political prominence. Pro-Western leaders have strengthened relations with Western institutions and attempted to decrease dependence on Russia. The political back-and-forth has defined Moldova for some time, and the recent elections represent the state’s official turning point, ending years of geopolitical tug-of-war between East and West.
Election Results
In 2022, Moldova changed its electoral code, which played a significant role in this election cycle. Voting by mail was introduced, increasing participation among Moldovans living abroad, notably in EU states. In the 2021 parliamentary elections, approximately 205,000 Moldovans living abroad voted [1]. In 2025, this number shot up to approximately 275,000 [2]. This increase brought in more votes from people living further away from Russian influence in various democratic states. The new code also took action against foreign interference, including the prohibition of foreign funding for political campaigns and stricter criteria for candidate registration, to combat participation by those linked to unconstitutional parties [3]. By directly restricting the financial aid Russia is providing to political campaigns, the Moldovan government is reducing the leverage Russia has over politicians living in Moldova.
The election was not without controversy. Even with the new electoral code in place, the Moldovan government anticipated interference in the breakaway region of Transnistria, under de facto Russian control, and did not allow voting there. Moldovans living abroad played a major role in this election, but those living in Russia were given far fewer opportunities to vote than in years past. In past elections, Russia hosted 17 voting stations, whereas in 2025, there were just two. Moldova states that fear for its citizens due to the current Russian-Ukrainian war is the reason for this cutback in voting stations.
These restrictions expectedly caused an outrage in Moscow. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated, “hundreds of thousands of Moldovans were deprived of the opportunity to vote in Russia because there were only two polling stations open to them, which was, of course, insufficient." In response to these claims, Moldova’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that “strongly condemns the recent statements of officials from the Russian Federation,” calling them “maneuvers of the information war [4].” Notably, in the 2021 elections, 6,000 Moldovans in Russia voted, significantly less than “hundreds of thousands [5].” Igor Dodon, leader of the Patriot Electoral Bloc – a coalition of three pro-Russian parties, and runner-up to the P.A.S. in the election with ~24% of the votes – claimed Transnistrians faced “all sorts of harassment, stopping them from voting [6]".
This election came at a critical time for Moldova. In 2022, after Russia invaded Ukraine, Moldova officially applied to join the EU. This boldly declared their solidarity with Ukraine, and their desire to break away from Russian influence – although they still relied heavily on Russian gas. It also made clear their need for military help and security guarantees with the war raging next door. Candidate status was granted just months after, and Moldova’s journey towards EU membership was officially underway.
Comparison With Georgia
Georgia submitted its application on the same day as Moldova, sending a similar message to Russia. It took 9 months for candidate status to be granted, and reforms had to be made, but eventually they were accepted as official candidates. Russia has had long-standing conflict in, and control over, many parts of Georgia. Moscow acted fast to prevent Georgia from getting any closer to EU membership. In 2022, Russian foreign direct investment in Georgia reached a record high $105.6 million [7]. This is an example of the economic and political pressure from Russia that many believe caused Georgia to have a “democratic backslide” that halted their progress towards EU membership.
In early 2024, Georgia passed a law requiring all non-governmental organizations and media groups that receive 20% or more of their funding to register as “agents of foreign influence [8]”. A similar law passed in Russia has led to the persecution and silencing of political opposition voices, news groups, and human rights organizations. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also found evidence of vote buying, double voting, and voter intimidation in Georgia’s parliamentary elections occurring in late 2024. The OSCE also noted that the Georgian Dream party, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and with significant economic ties to Russia, was spreading hostile Russian disinformation and conspiracy theories [9]. The Georgian Dream party ended up winning the parliamentary majority with 54.09% of the votes.
Russian Influence in Moldova
Many feared similar tactics in Moldova would influence the outcome of the recent parliamentary elections and give the pro-Russian Patriot Bloc a parliamentary majority. This would pull Moldova back into Russia’s sphere of influence and halt its progress towards EU membership, to the disdain of many Moldovans at home and abroad. Leading up to the vote, Moldovan police reported evidence of Russian disinformation and attempts to buy votes, bomb scares at voting stations were reported in Italy, Romania, Spain, and the US, and an entire network paying residents for spreading pro-Russian propaganda and disinformation was discovered [10]. Moldova president Maia Sandu played an active role in helping Moldovans anticipate, recognize, and disregard this disinformation and propaganda that has been so effective in other states.
President Sandu has worked extensively to liberate the country from its dependence on Russian gas. Reliance on Russia for gas leaves the small country susceptible to pressure and threats of withdrawal [11]. As of late 2023, Moldova, excluding Transnistria, officially does not receive gas from any Russian suppliers. Moldova has especially strengthened relations with Romania, even constructing the lași-Ungheni-Chişnau pipeline, to facilitate the transportation of gas from Romania and other EU markets [12].
US Interest in Moldova
Washington is particularly interested in the success of democracy in Moldova. The US has always fought to defend democracy abroad, especially when authoritarian regimes are pressuring it. Moldova’s break from Russian influence shows that smaller democratic nations can survive pressure from larger authoritarian nations. Moldova is a critical case due to its location between Ukraine, a country in active war with Russia, and NATO member Romania.
The US has played an active role in supporting the Moldovan government in its efforts to eliminate reliance on Russia. From 2022 to 2024, the US provided Moldova with almost $950 million to address the economic repercussions of cutting off Russian gas. The US also pledged around $70 million to Moldova in January of 2025 to support infrastructure and cybersecurity. Moldova’s military and border security has also received support from the US. In April of 2024, the US State Department announced that the US is Moldova’s largest donor. US support is depends on key reforms that strengthen democracy in Moldova [13].
Conclusion
Updates to electoral codes, direct confrontation and exposition of disinformation, and the participation of Moldovans at home and abroad made this election a turning point for this post-Soviet nation. After years of back-and-forth, they are officially forging a path away from Russia and towards EU membership. The EU is heavily invested in the democratic success of Moldova, and recently pledged $1.5 billion in loans to Moldova to help overcome Russian “attempts to destabilise Moldova [14].” EU members will be closely monitoring the situation in Moldova, hoping they avoid the pitfalls that caused Georgia’s application to be put on ice. The United States has heavily invested in democracy in Moldova and sees the victory as a major success amid Russian intimidation and disinformation. It will be important to observe what reforms Moldova prioritizes as it implements financial support from the EU and US.
- https://www.moldpres.md/eng/politics/all-official-reports-received-from-polling-stations-opened-for-snap-parliamentary-elections-processed-in-moldova-
- https://radiomoldova.md/p/60083/parliamentary-elections-2025--live-text-diaspora-turnout-over-275-thousand-moldovans-cast-ballots-abroad
- https://a.cec.md/storage/ckfinder/files/New%20Electoral%20Code_ENG_2022.pdf
- https://ipn.md/en/the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-condemns-the-statements-of-russian-officials-about-the-falsification-of-the-vote-in-moldova-through-the-diaspora/
- https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/29/world/europe/moldova-elections-russia-europe.html
- https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-accuses-moldova-preventing-hundreds-thousands-moldovans-russia-voting-2025-09-29/
- https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/russian-influence-operations-in-georgia-a-threat-to-democracy-and-regional-stability
- https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/17/georgia-foreign-agents-law-protests/
- https://www.dw.com/en/georgia-ruling-georgian-dream-party-wins-election/a-70611564
- https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2rdlj8ejgo
- https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2023-09-14/moldova-reduction-russian-influence-gas-sector
- https://borgenproject.org/iasi-ungheni-chisinau/
- https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48664
- https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/12/17/reform-and-growth-facility-for-moldova-council-agrees-its-negotiating-position/