Afghanistan

One year ago, the United States ended its longest war in Afghanistan. It was the end because the US pulled all military (and many other) personnel from the country. Following the US action, the Taliban quickly took control of the country. The speed of this takeover was surprising to the world.

The United States faces new difficulties to a clear terrorism policy. As it no longer has a physical presence in Afghanistan and seeks to continuously curb the influence of terror groups in the Middle East, the United States has utilized over-the-horizon drone strikes against terror leaders. This strategy had particular attention in the Trump and Biden administrations with drone strikes against Iranian general Qasem Soleimani and Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, respectively. Although over-the-horizon strikes provide a relatively simple alternative to on-the-ground forces, the problems raised by their extensive intelligence requirements and implications for U.S. involvement outside warzones makes this policy unsustainable. This article is meant to analyze both the history and probability of its implementation. Though over-the-horizon strikes can include the use of special forces groups, this definition will focus strictly on drone strikes.

A hunger crisis now faces the people of Afghanistan, and the United States holds the key to a significant part of resource flow into the country. As the Taliban implement their authoritarian control of the country, human rights abuses have become more widespread and a hunger crisis risks putting millions into famine condition. The United States may be able to leverage access to much need food and medical supplies to ensure that the Taliban do not revert to their horrific rule of the 1990’s.

The Taliban remains a threat to the stability and continual development of a democratic government in Afghanistan. A lack of an American military presence will likely encourage the Taliban to expand their power. Aggression against Afghans has increased dramatically since the start of this year. If the Taliban were to gain control, the country could become a renewed haven for terrorist groups and threats to the United States.

On September 5, 2019, a suicide car bombing ripped through downtown Kabul, Afghanistan, killing ten people, including a U.S. soldier. The Taliban claimed responsibility for this and another attack three days earlier that killed sixteen people just east of the capital city. In response, President Donald Trump publicly called off a secret meeting with Taliban officials scheduled for that weekend and declared that peace negotiations were “dead.” This breakdown in talks marks the ninth time that talks have been proposed and subsequently fallen apart since the start of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2001.

Pakistan has been gambling for a long time with its use of militants as a strategic edge over India. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) created and utilized different groups that we generally label as “Taliban” in order to counter Indian power in the region. This has been a several decade-long endeavor but is now showing signs of failure as India is increasing its influence in Afghanistan. In this context, Indian-Pakistani relations will likely prove to be an even more critical national security issue as we scale back military efforts in the region.

Afghanistan will face two major issues this year. The more publicized issue is Pakistan’s refusal to open up their supply routes into Afghanistan for NATO use. The lesser known issue is the devastatingly poor poppy harvest. Both of these problems will create unique challenges for NATO forces. A brief examination of the problems will show points of concern that need to be addressed.

To coincide with the anniversary of the raid that killed Osama bin laden, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point released 17 de-classified documents obtained in bin Laden’s Abbattobad compound. These 17 documents are a small fraction of the thousands of documents recovered from the raid. Despite their small number, these documents add color to our understanding of al-Qaeda’s leadership; namely, the relationship that al-Qaeda leaders maintained with its affiliates was the subject of internal debate and scrutiny. The insights gained from these prior inner workings may offer a glimpse into understanding the current dynamics of al-Qaeda methodology

The attack in France this past week at the hands of the terrorist Mohammed Merah is reawakening Europe to the realities of radicalization. This event should not be viewed as the beginning of a complex new terror campaign domestically but should be seen as an infrequent reality of war with terror groups. The majority of attempted domestic attacks have been unsuccessful for a number of reasons, and most people who are successfully recruited end up going to conflict areas in order to train and act out their new sense of ideology rather than stay in their country. A quick overview of some aspects of the radicalization process will reveal that there is no trend towards coordinated attacks or rampant radicalization in the West.

On February 2nd, 2012, spokesman for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Col. Marcelo Burgos, announced that due to an evening air strike, several leaders of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group had been killed. This group has been the cause of fear and disturbance in the southern islands of the Philippines for almost 30 years. The group has been known for its bombings, kidnappings, and killings. The group defines itself as an Islamic Separtist cult that is seeking an independent Iranian-style Islamic theocracy in the southern Philippines. With the recurring Abu Sayyaf threat, this air strike serves as a monumental victory for the Armed Forces in their fight against terrorism.